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1. Factual and normative elements in the analyses of plurinational 
democracies 
The debate that began in the 1980s between the liberal and communitarian 
perspectives and, subsequently from the early 1990s onwards between what 
have been called Liberalism 1 and Liberalism 2,1 has highlighted the importance 
that empirical cultural and national collectivities have in individuals’ self-
understanding and self-esteem. Some of these entities are groups that do not 
always coincide with the group that comprises the polity which defines 
citizenship. This debate has also revealed the inability of the liberal, democratic 
and social rights included in constitutions to regulate an egalitarian and 
equitable treatment of individuals belonging to national minorities. Moreover, it 
has revealed the fact that it is impossible for states to play a culturally and 
nationally neutral role, the way they can regarding other phenomena, such as 
religion. Consequently, in many cases, national groups have an important moral 
role to play in not exhausting the individual components and dimensions of the 
basic values of liberty, pluralism and political equality. 
The construction of increasingly refined liberal democracies in terms of 
cultural and national pluralism is one of the biggest challenges in the 
normative and institutional revision of contemporary democratic systems. In 
the last two decades, analyses in political science, political theory and 
constitutionalism have revealed several factors that come into play in a political 
and moral refinement in plurinational federal democracies. The following is a 
list of factual and normative elements that, I think, they must be taking into 
account in the analyses of these kind of democracies. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Taylor 1992. 
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1.1. Factual-analytical elements 
1. In practical terms, most human beings are culturally and nationally rooted. 
2. Classical liberal and federal political theories were created in much simpler 
contexts than present-day societies. 
3. Nation-building processes exist in all states, including liberal-democratic 
ones. All states are agents of nationalism and nationalisation. There are at least 
partially competitive values, interests and identities within plurinational 
democracies. There are different narrations and reconstructions of history and 
collective memories. 
4. States usually treat the internal national differences within democracies as 
“particularist deviations”. A practical response has been to promote the cultural 
and national assimilation of minorities in order to achieve their “political 
integration”. The practical consequence has been marginalisation of the internal 
national minorities in the name of “citizenship” and “popular sovereignty” (of 
the state). 
5. The abstract and universalist language that underlies the liberal values of 
liberty, equality and pluralism has contrasted, in practical terms, with the 
exclusion of a number of voices with regard to the regulation of specific 
liberties, equalities and pluralisms in contemporary societies (those who do not 
own property, women, indigenous people, ethnic, linguistic and national 
minorities).  
6. Each of these movements gives rise to specific questions regarding 
recognition and political accommodation (group rights, self-government, 
defence of particular cultural values, presence in the international arena, etc.). 
There are insufficient liberal, democratic and social rights to protect and 
develop the cultural and national features of minorities. 
7. Nation-building and state-building processes have conditioned the 
conception (theory) and evolution (practices) of federalism. 
 
1.2. Normative-analytical elements 
8. Cultural and national liberties are elements in the quality of a democracy.  
Individuals’ self-understanding and self-esteem is important (United Nations, 
Human Development Report 2004). 
9. Normative importance of historical events. The political contexts in which 
individuals are socialised are often the result of historical processes that usually 
include violent features – wars of annexation, exterminations, mass 
deportations, etc. – which are sometimes at the root of minority nations’ 
modern-day struggles for recognition and self-governance. 
10. There are two general theoretical attitudes in policy-making when dealing 
with national pluralism: pragmatic (to avoid conflicts in the least costly way 
possible) and moral (to approach it as a question of “justice” – fair relations 
between permanent majorities and minorities). 
11. There are two general theoretical paradigms in relation to questions of 
socioeconomic or cultural/national justice in pluralist societies: the paradigm of 
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equality (distribution) versus the paradigm of difference (recognition and 
political accommodation) 
12. The theory of demos or demoi is missing in traditional theories of democracy 
(whether they be of a more liberal or a more republican nature), as is a liberal 
theory of legitimised borders 
13. The state as a “culturally neutral” entity is a myth of traditional liberalism. 
14. Individual and collective identities are not fixed, but we make choices based 
on them. The belief that we are “autonomous individuals” who choose our 
national, ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc, identities is, to a great extent, another 
myth of traditional liberalism. 
15. There are flaws in traditional liberalism based on its individualist, 
universalist and statist elements when they are applied to plurinational societies 
(“deviations”, “conceptions of citizenship” and “popular sovereignty”, etc) 
 
2. “Classical” Institutional Responses 
It would appear that the first condition for solving a problem is to try to define 
or describe it correctly, and defining and describing a problem correctly involves 
establishing at least three aspects. The first is knowing how to identify what the 
basic issue is, that is, identifying the decisive question that needs to be 
considered. Secondly, defining a problem also involves knowing how to describe 
it with the maximum precision possible. This implies both a careful 
conceptualisation and the inclusion of historical elements, along with the most 
important empirical data related to the problem. Thirdly, defining a problem 
means knowing where to look for possible solutions, in the spheres of both 
political theory and comparative politics. When we have a question and do not 
know where to go to find the answers, this usually means that from an 
epistemological perspective we are not on the right track. 
One of the most important questions with regard to the case of 
plurinational democracies is the recognition and political accommodation of 
the national pluralism of these democracies. Obviously, in addition to this 
question there are probably a whole series of interrelated aspects: economic 
development, income inequalities, multiculturality and membership in supra-
state organisations, such as the European Union, etc. But it is methodologically 
improper to mix all these elements from the outset. In this case, the key point is 
not to establish how the demos becomes kratos – this would be the traditional 
vision of democracy – but how the different national demoi which coexist within 
the same democracy are politically and constitutionally recognised and 
accommodated in terms of equality (between the national majorities and 
minorities) in the kratos of the polity. This involves dealing with and 
introducing aspects of both a “democratic” nature – participation by majorities 
and minorities in “shared governance” – and, above all, of a “liberal” nature – 
the protection and development of minority nations confronting the “tyranny of 
the (national) majority”, both in the internal sphere of this democracy and in 
the international arena. It is, therefore, a matter of determining the “checks and 
balances” in a collective dimension which have received little or no attention 
from traditional political conceptions but which constitute specific dimensions 
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of core questions of liberal political theory, such as the “negative theory” of the 
“tyranny of the majority”.  
Whatever the most suitable liberal-democratic solution or solutions may 
be will obviously depend on matters like the context of each specific case (its 
history, international situation, types of actors, political culture, etc.). But it 
seems clear that in contexts of national pluralism it is essential to establish a 
much more refined interpretation than what is offered by the basic values of 
traditional liberal-democratic constitutionalism: liberty, equality, individual 
dignity and pluralism. This complexity demands theories that are more sensitive 
and attuned to the variations in empirical realities when attempting to clearly 
identify its basic legitimising values. Moreover, it demands above all practical, 
institutional and procedural solutions that are much more suitable for the type 
of pluralism to be accommodated. These are two aspects of the liberal-
democratic agenda that have yet to be satisfactorily resolved. 
The three “classic” institutional responses for societies with a strong 
component of national diversity2 have been: 
1. Federalism (in a broad sense, including federations, associated states, 
federacies, confederations and regional states) 
2. Consociationalism: institutions and processes of a “consociational” 
nature (based on consensus between the majorities and permanent national 
minorities). Examples of these institutions and processes can be found in the 
democracies of Switzerland and Belgium, in both cases in conjunction with 
federal solutions 
3. Secession. 
Let us now look at some elements offered by political theory and 
comparative politics with regard to federalism. The generic question is whether 
federalism offers a suitable framework for establishing the recognition and 
accommodation of plurinational democracies and, if so, which federal models 
are most suitable and which are not. 
 
3. Federalism and plurinational federations. Some theoretical and 
historical remarks 
The fundamental challenge facing plurinational federations nowadays can be 
synthesised as a liberal, democratic and national challenge of polity-building. 
The main question, in essence, is whether it is possible to combine within the 
same federation the political perspective of the construction of a federal unit 
that usually predominates among the majority national groups in the state and 
the perspective of a confederal union that usually predominates among the 
minority national entities in the federation. Both kinds of realities are usually 
based on different legitimising concepts and values, although the same terms 
are often used. This difference is expressed in the diverse conceptions regarding 
which rights, duties, institutions and political collective decision-making 
processes are legitimate in liberal-democratic terms when applied to realities 
                                                 
2 See Norman 2006, Amoretti-Bermeo 2004; McGarry 2002, Gagnon-Tully 2001; Watts 1999; 
Lijphart 1999. 
 
Democracy and national pluralism: Ethical and institutional features CSSR, 7 (2017)      69 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
characterised by strong components of national pluralism. The question 
regarding the probability of combining these two perspectives, that is, the 
probability of establishing a political and constitutional accommodation of de 
facto national pluralism, cannot be answered in abstract terms but must involve 
the institutional practices of comparative politics and case analysis.  
Broadly speaking, federalism is a notion that has been neither historically 
nor normatively related to national pluralism until quite recently. In fact, it is 
evident that both classic institutional analyses and those of a normative nature 
regarding federalism have been heavily influenced by the historical example of 
the United States, the first contemporary federation.3 And this is an empirical 
case that is not related to national pluralism. If we remain in the orbit of the 
Unites States’ federalism, the response to the question concerning the 
possibilities of political accommodation of plurinational societies by means of 
federal formulas is basically negative. The fundamental reasons for this are both 
historical and organisational. This is essentially a uninational model that avoids, 
yet implicitly responds to, a fundamental question that democratic theories 
have paradoxically failed answer: what is “the people”, the demos, and who 
decides what “the people” refers to. If we take empirical data into account, it 
would appear practically impossible to politically empower the different demoi 
in a plurinational society within the uninational rules of the game in the United 
States’ federal model. 
Similarly, the fact that the first contemporary federation was the 
influential case of the United States – which was built using strong uninational 
and symmetric components, and a strong Supreme Court that acted as a polity-
maker during its practical development – has not been unrelated to the 
evolution of federations and federal thought that was dominant until recently (J. 
Madison, Federalist Papers, 10, 51). This is an evolution that is very different 
from the more “confederal” logic that characterises the political systems and the 
political thought of the classic form of federalism prior to the American 
federation (Althusius, Politica Methodice Digesta VIII) – a conception that 
survived into the modern era in Switzerland and the Netherlands, albeit not for 
long in the latter.  
On other hand, the American federalist tradition associated with the 
creation of the first federal state in the contemporary era based its approach to 
federalism on much more federal than confederal foundations. Here, the centre 
of gravity is located in the governance of a modern nation-state and the 
subsequent supremacy of the central power over the federated powers. One of 
the explicit objectives is to avoid the instability that confederations have 
repeatedly shown at an empirical level. In contrast to the school of thought 
represented by Althusius and Montesquieu, the establishment of the federation 
should not involve existing social and territorial divisions but should attempt to 
construct a new polity that subsumes the old divisions by establishing new 
processes of state-building and nation-building. Here, the union is more 
important than the units. Depending on the federal conception we locate 
                                                 
3 See Requejo 2011, Burgess 2006, Karmis-Norman 2005, Hueglin 2003, Neremberg-Griffiths 
2002. 
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ourselves within, we will reach different conclusions in all the spheres of 
territorial accommodation. 
In contemporary federations and regional states, the tension between 
liberal, democratic, national and functional logics has been resolved in 
“national” terms, usually in the federation’s favour. However, the interpretation 
of the values of liberty, equality and pluralism will be different depending on 
whether one is dealing with uninational or plurinational liberal democracies, 
especially with regard to collective or group liberties and rights, the subjects of 
equality or the type of pluralism to be protected or guaranteed. Let us look at 
the present, for example. The classical questions “equality, of what?” or “who 
are the equals?” will receive different “federal” responses depending on whether 
we situate ourselves in the Althusian or Madisonian tradition of federalism, and 
depending on whether we situate ourselves in a conception that is linked to 
Liberalism 1 or Liberalism 2 from the analytical and normative debate on liberal 
democracies.  
On the other hand, the history of federalism, or to be more precise, the 
history of federations, has mainly been characterised by the development of 
models that are basically symmetric. Comparative politics shows in what way 
symmetric models have not been a particularly propitious option when there are 
coexistent or juxtaposed nation-building processes within the same political 
system. Symmetry stimulates uniformity in the political system’s “entrance 
requirements”. And that makes achieving real political accommodation difficult, 
when the pluralism of national minorities constitutes a form of de facto 
asymmetry which requires that the plurinationality be recognised using the 
same “entrance requirements” of the constitutional system.  
To sum up, the symbolic and institutional challenges, as well as the 
challenges related to the rules of decision-making, which plurinational societies 
pose for federalism are usually more complex than those posed by uninational 
societies. And it seems clear that the Madisonian and Liberalism 1 approaches 
show difficulties and flaws in plurinational democracies. Both miss the 
aforementioned real target in this kind of polities. In addition to the search for 
“common ground” in the federation, the issue which most concerns minority 
nations is the establishment of institutions and protection mechanisms of a 
“liberal” nature in the constitutional sphere that protects them from the 
decisions taken by the majorities. This political accommodation involves the 
establishment of broad forms of self-government and participation in the shared 
government of the federation that is based on their own national characteristics. 
Let us take a comparative look at the empirical world of federal democracies. 
 
4. Plurinational federalism. A comparative approach 
Broadly speaking, current analyses of states that display a clear territorial 
division of federal or regional powers can be situated along five basic axes, 
depending on the research questions that one is attempting to answer: 
a) the uninational-plurinational axis 
b) the unitarianism-federalism axis 
c) the centralisation-decentralisation axis 
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d) the symmetry-asymmetry axis 
e) the competitiveness-cooperation axis 
These analytical axes require a diverse battery of variables and indicators 
which can be used to carry out a comparative approach. The universe of the 
analysis below is comprised of democratic federations –excluding cases based 
on archipelagic federations such as Micronesia, the Comoros and St Kitts and 
Nevis, as well as federations which are far from the liberal-democratic logic (the 
United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.).4 Associated states/federacies and 
supra-state entities such as the European Union have been also excluded. On 
the other hand, we include three Western European democratic regional states 
which display a clear territorial division of powers: the United Kingdom, Spain 
and Italy. Altogether, there are 20 federations or regional states in the following 
analysis. 
1. The uninational-plurinational axis is applied according to the 
theoretical and double empirical criterion – party systems/effective number of 
parties, and secessionist parties within them – which I have developed 
elsewhere.5 
2. The unitarianism-federalism axis focuses on how federal a federation 
(or a regional state) is. It is established using constitutional regulations which 
are more or less favourable to a federal institutional logic from the perspective 
of the federated units.6  
3. The centralisation-decentralisation axis refers to the degree of 
constitutional self-governance of the units with political autonomy.7  
                                                 
4 Here, I follow the same methodology that I used in previous comparative works, this time 
introducing updated empirical data and some changes in the cases considered. See Requejo 
2010, sec 2-4. 
5 See Requejo 2010, sec 2 
6 The indicators will include the existence or not of: federated polities as constituent units (1); 
constitutional guarantee of their self-governance (1); agreement for constitutional reform (1); an 
institutional dualism in relation to the three classic powers: the executive and legislative (2) and 
the judicial (1); a model of fiscal federalism (2); an upper chamber with representatives 
appointed by the institutions of the federated entities (1), and with seats distributed along 
territorial lines (not proportional to the population) (1); powers of the upper chamber within the 
institutional system (2); the allocation of unallocated powers to the federated units (2); a court 
to arbitrate in disputes (2), with the sub-state entities having a say on who is appointed to it (2); 
and the regulation or not of a right of secession of (some) the federated units (2). The numbers 
in brackets refer to the score given to each indicator. Altogether, the global scale of each case is 
situated between 0 (absence of a federal logic) and 20 (maximum degree of constitutional 
federalism). See Annexe 1. We do not consider in this axis “para-institutional” indicators, those 
which have an effect on federalism as a process (e.g., political-party systems; intergovernmental 
relations). An analysis applied to a group of 11 federal and regional countries using a number of 
slightly different indicators, in Baldi 2003 (2nd ed. 2005).  
7 Here, the degree of decentralisation (or lack of centralisation) is also measured on a global 
scale which ranges from a score of 0 (maximum centralisation) to 20 (maximum 
decentralisation). It is also measured using different indicators: a) the kind of legislative powers 
held by these sub-units (8) -subdivided in specific areas of government as follows: 
economy/infrastructures/communication (2), education and culture (2), welfare (2), internal 
affairs/penal/civil codes and others (2); b) the executive/administrative powers (2); c) whether 
or not the federated entities have the right to conduct their own foreign policy, taking into 
account both the scope of the matters and agreements with federal support (2); and d) their 
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4. The symmetry-asymmetry axis includes the cases with de jure 
institutional regulations or competencies for specific territorial sub-units.8 
 
Figure 1. Degree of constitutional federalism and degree of 
decentralisation in the cases studied9 
 
 
The following are general comparative remarks regarding the feasibility 
of federations accommodating plurinational societies. We will consider five 
different aspects: the constitutional recognition of the national pluralism of 
these kinds of polities, the degree of decentralization, the degree of 
constitutional federalism, the inclusion of de jure asymmetries in plurinational 
polities and, finally, whether or not a right of secession for national minorities is 
included in the constitutional rules.  
                                                                                                                                               
economic decentralization (8), calculated according to a single average index obtained taking 
into account the distribution of the public revenues and the public expenditures (GFS/IMF 
indexes) in each country. See Annexe 2. Data from 
http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm. See also 
Rodden 2004 
8 See Watts 2005, Requejo 2011, Agranoff 1999. We exclude federal capitals from asymmetry 
criteria; in the following calculations, Quebec, Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders are the 
reference for the cases of Canada, Spain, the UK and Belgium. 
9 The cases of Ethiopia and Malaysia are not included in the degree of decentralisation due to 
the lack of reliable economic data. 
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1. Political recognition of national pluralism in plurinational 
federations. Ethiopia and Russia formally recognise their plurinational nature. 
However, all other federations and regional states are reluctant to permit 
explicit recognition of national pluralism in their constitutional agreements.  
2. Degree of federalism, decentralisation and asymmetries. Broadly 
speaking, the group of plurinational federations paradoxically show a degree of 
federalism which is more uniform and lower than the group of uninational 
federations (except for the special case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which shows 
some confederal characteristics). That is, there is a federalist deficit in 
plurinational federations. However, these polities are more constitutionally 
asymmetrical than uninational federations. In fact, there are no cases of clearly 
symmetrical plurinational federations. Not surprisingly, the two regional 
plurinational cases – Spain and the United Kingdom – receive the lowest scores 
on their degree of federalism within the plurinational states. These trends 
prompt questions on whether federations/regional states are suitable for 
properly managing plurinational polities when accommodating politically 
minority nations is not only a question of decentralization but also of political 
recognition of their national status, and of regulation of their collective 
constitutional negative and positive liberties.  
3. The elements of asymmetry in plurinational federations is sometimes 
regulated within general symmetrical guidelines in the territorial division of 
powers (with the presence of pressure in favour of the symmetry of the system). 
This mainly occurs when the number of federated units is not small (at least 
nine: Canada, India, Russia, Ethiopia and Spain, in contrast to Belgium, the 
United Kingdom and Bosnia-Herzegovina).10  
4. The construction of “federal trust” in plurinational 
federations/regional states requires the existence of at least two factors: a) clear 
mechanisms that allow the minority nations to participate in the shared 
governance of the federation based on their uniqueness, instead of diluting 
them to become just another entity within the federation (presence in the upper 
chamber, bilateral inter-governmental relations between these entities and the 
federation, consociational institutions, etc.); and b) rules which protect national 
minorities from the actions of the majorities. This is an issue that is more 
“liberal” than “democratic” in nature (related to the collective “tyranny of the 
majority”).11 If specific participation and protection mechanisms are absent 
(Spain), or if they are insufficiently regulated (Russia), the perception of a 
federalism of distrust by the minorities (and the majorities in reaction) will 
                                                 
10 An analysis of the evolution of ten European multilevel cases which started their process of 
decentralization asymmetrically, in Requejo-Nagel 2011. It is currently an open question 
whether the federations’ reluctance to introduce more asymmetric regulations, especially when 
the number of subunits is not small, will or will not reinforce territorial tensions and 
secessionist positions. 
11 It favours the inclusion of institutional procedures such as veto powers, “alarm bell” and 
opting-in/opting-out policies (which do not require constitutional reforms), the appointment of 
some of the judges on the Supreme or Constitutional Courts, distinct participation in 
constitutional reform processes, asymmetrical intergovernmental relations, etc. Most of these 
procedures, which point to models of plurinational federalism or partnership, are absent or 
have a low profile in the constitutions of most plurinational democracies. See Watts 1999, 
Requejo 2005, ch. 4-5. 
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increase. From a normative perspective, this misrepresents the interpretation of 
collective liberal negative freedom in plurinational federal democracies. 
Moreover, it would seem advisable to develop a kind of political culture for the 
entire federation in order to develop a stable federal trust: a “plurinational 
culture” which makes the plurality of the internal demoi a feature of the 
“political union”. 
5. Right of secession. In conceptual terms, there is nothing to prevent the 
issue of where borders should be established from being part of the democratic 
debate. But on an empirical level, it is clear that states are jealous of their own 
territories. The introduction of a right of secession for the minority nations 
represents a clear break with the dominant logic of federations, although not 
with the tradition of federalism. This logic only accepts the right to self-
determination for the federation. But it is an interpretation which a number of 
federations have begun to question. Recent examples include Canada (through 
the “federal pattern” of the 1998 Secession Reference by the Supreme Court) 
and Ethiopia (or the more specific cases of the former Serbia-Montenegro and 
St Kitts and Nevis) (see Table 1).12 This table summarises the right of secession 
in current plurinational countries. 
 
Table 1. Right of secession in plurinational democracies 
Plurinational 
Federations 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
No 
Belgium No 
Canada YesA 
Ethiopia Yes 
India No 
Russia No 
(Serbia and 
Montenegro) 
YesB 
Plurinational 
Regional States 
SpainC No 
United Kingdom YesD 
A Right of Seccession according federal (non unilateral) rules 
B Federation broken by unilateral referendum in Montenegro (2006) 
C State with some federal trends 
D According to negotiated rules (2014) 
 
                                                 
12 In contrast to what the anti-symmetric argument of the stepping-stone towards secession 
suggests, the states which went through secession processes in the 20th century were not 
asymmetrical federations but unitarian states (United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Indonesia) or 
socialist pseudo-federations (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia). See McGarry 2002; Norman 
2006. 
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It is probable that the 21st century will witness political movements in 
favour of the “right to decide” by the citizens of minority nations13 who wish to 
preserve as much collective negative liberty as possible in an increasingly 
globalised world. These are movements which democratic federal theory and 
practice, and they deserve more attention than they have gotten in the 
contemporary era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 In recent years, there have been examples of such movements in Quebec, Flanders, Scotland, 
the Basque Country and Catalonia. 
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